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Defining the Economic Pie, Not  
Dividing or Maximizing It 
 
Martha T. McCluskey 
Abstract 
This essay challenges the question that drives much of legal analysis: whether to maximize 
or divide the “economic pie.” Regardless of the answer, this question skews legal analysis 
and rests on dubious economics. This framing binary inherently presents economic 
maximizing as the presumptive norm, represented as superior to socioeconomic 
distribution in both spatial and temporal dimensions. By definition, economic 
“maximizing” stands larger in scope and first in order. The essay first critiques the idea 
that legal analysis can aim to make the economy bigger without engaging contested 
questions of value and politics, showing how this misleading separation of quantity from 
quality closes off rigorous thinking about legal institutions and processes vital to 
meaningful economic prosperity. Second, the essay challenges the binary’s sequential 
presentation of social justice as “redistribution” occurring after an imagined step of 
economic maximizing. That sequence sets up a narrative that distorts and narrows our 
vision of both the causes and solutions to problems of inequality and other social and 
environmental qualities. Instead, law and economic analysis should focus on how law 
should define the “economic pie,” recognizing that moral and political questions of 
justice are fundamentally inseparable from questions of economic gain. 
 
* * * 
What’s wrong with analyzing law in terms of two distinct economic functions: maximizing 
economic gain versus distributing it? That division sets up the question that drives much 
of legal analysis: whether to maximize or divide the “economic pie.”1 Regardless of the 
answer, the question itself undermines both sound legal economic analysis and social 
justice. Instead, we should ask: what values and powers should define the economic pie? 
I. Dividing the Legal Economic Order 
A. The Conventional Binary Frame  
In their classic law and economics textbook, Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen 
assert that economics has “spectacularly” succeeded as a guide to jurisprudence and policy 
                                                 
 Professor of Law and William J. Magavern Scholar, University at Buffalo, State University of New York, 
mcclusk@buffalo.edu. 
1 Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1003, 1005 (2001) 
(stating that efficiency is the principal focus of law and economics, separate from distribution); Ted Hamilton, Why 
Law School’s Love Affair with Economics Is Terrible for the American Legal System, SALON (July 26, 2014) 
(reporting that efficiency, not justice, was the most common focus of his first year courses at Harvard Law School) 
(http://www.salon.com/2014/07/26/why_law_schools_love_affair_with_economics_needs_to_stop/).  
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because it scientifically predicts law’s effects.2 The sixth and latest edition does not temper 
its triumphant view in the wake of the 2008 global financial collapse, despite leading 
economists’ confident predictions that deregulated financial markets would ensure 
stability and growth.3 Presenting the orthodox frame without question or qualification, the 
textbook states that economic analysis evaluates law according to two overarching criteria: 
efficiency and distribution.4  
  Efficiency, the textbook explains, represents maximum societal gain, taking into 
account all benefits and minimizing waste.5 Efficiency is always a relevant and rational 
criterion for law, because no one wants to waste money.6 Further, the authors report that 
“almost all” economists favor policies that increase efficiency.7 In contrast, the authors 
present distribution as an inherently debatable criterion for law: a question of which 
classes or interests should gain or lose.8 They note that economic analysis need not take 
sides in such distributive questions.9  
 With some refinements and variations, this basic frame grounds much of 
contemporary analysis of law. Many scholars use the term “welfare” to represent the goal 
of maximum (or “optimal”) societal benefit distinct from values of fairness or 
distribution.10 Although many defend the contrasting goal of redistribution as a legitimate 
function of law, few question the frame that distinguishes this goal from economic 
maximizing.  
B. The Divided Frame’s Ideological Tilt  
 Law and economics typically presents the choice of maximizing versus dividing as 
the central value choice for law.11 But the more fundamental judgment of value is 
embedded in the question itself. This foundational divide skews legal analysis even when 
                                                 
2 Robert D. Cooter & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Economics 3 (6th ed. 2012).  
3 See, e.g., David Colander et al., The Financial Crisis and the Systemic Failure of Academic Economics, 
Kiel Working Paper 1489 (Feb. 2009) (faulting economic models designed to disregard key elements of the 
real world).  
4 Id. at 3-7.  
5 Id. at 3-4. 
6 Id. at 4. 
7 Id.  
8 Id.  
9 See id. (stating that some do, while others do not).  
10 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare (2002) (arguing that legal rules should focus 
solely on maximizing “welfare”); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cost Benefit Analysis and the Judicial 
Role 8 (Feb. 7, 2017) (claiming most people believe government should advance “social welfare,” best 
measured by aggregating individual willingness to pay in the existing market).  
11 Cooter & Ulen, supra note 2, at 4.  
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used without ideological intent, and even when deployed to resist right-wing policies.12 
Though even-handed on the surface, this division inherently positions maximizing as the 
presumptive legal economic norm, with distribution as the exception or supplement 
needing special justification or limitation.  
 The frame tilts the field by contrasting these two goals in both spatial dimension 
and in time sequence. By binary definition, economic “maximizing” stands larger in scope 
and first in order. The colloquial “pie” metaphor highlights this spatial and temporal 
hierarchy. Before law can divide the pie, law needs the growth that produces the pie. And, 
with a bigger pie, law can distribute more or bigger slices to better satisfy particular 
distributive interests.  
 The more technical versions of the binary build on that basic skewed view. If we 
increase “efficiency” or “welfare,” that means we generate more total resources or benefits 
(however defined) for subsequent distribution. “Redistribution,” in contrast, represents 
what we do with the resources already produced, so that it generally appears as a zero-
sum transfer, or perhaps a net loss.  
  On this slanted field, distributive goals like social justice or fairness stand as 
secondary and expendable choices, inherently dependent on protecting or 
accommodating the goal of maximizing. In contrast, maximizing appears to be an 
essential function. While this frame leaves open the choice to “balance” maximizing with 
distributive policies, it implicitly places that choice as ancillary to the central goal of 
maximizing.  
 Beyond semantics, this definitional tilt reflects a dubious economics. The division 
between efficiency and equity emerged from a twentieth century effort to identify 
economics with the “harder” natural sciences like physics, rather than with social sciences 
and philosophy.13 This approach emphasizes markets as a mechanistic system of mutual 
gain produced through decentralized atomized voluntary exchange. That theory of 
economics is not only widely criticized, but is also particularly unsuited to legal analysis. 
Other approaches to economics analyze how markets operate as systems of power and 
governance interrelated with law and politics.14 Similarly, an extensive and esteemed 
economic literature goes well beyond decontextualized microeconomics to consider the 
impact of political economic institutions like colonialism, slavery, industrial policy, 
consumer demand, public education, antitrust law, infrastructure, corporate governance, 
taxation, or currency controls.  
                                                 
12 See Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the 
Welfare State, 78 Ind. L.J 783, 833-39, 864-71 (2003) (explaining disadvantages of framing social insurance 
programs as compensation for dependency and incapacity).  
13 See Mark Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect 575 (5th ed. 1996) (explaining the failed historical quest 
for a positivist ground for this distinction central to neoclassical welfare economics). 
14 For general discussion of this approach, see Warren J. Samuels, The Legal-Economic Nexus, 57 Geo. L. 
Rev. 1556 (1989).  
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 By rejecting the simplistic efficiency-distribution frame, we can more accurately 
understand law’s potential for fostering and sustaining meaningful economic growth. 
Further, we can better advance social justice without imagining that goal as a problem of 
slicing a separately established economic pie. Instead, we should analyze concerns like 
equity, sustainability and fairness as first-order questions about the content and rules that 
constitute a legitimately productive and prosperous economy and society.15  
 Toward that end, this essay explores how the maximizing-dividing binary limits 
and obscures our understanding of law and economy. I first examine the biases embedded 
in the framing division’s spatial contrast between “more economic pie” and “differently 
sliced economic pie.” Then, I examine the flawed assumptions of the temporal sequence 
that puts economic maximizing before “distribution.” This essay’s critique is part of a 
larger book project in which I explore how the binary frame operates through a variety of 
economic concepts in law to obscure sound legal economic analysis.  
II. Spatial Order: Measuring Gain by Reducing Substance 
The maximizing-dividing framework separates the size of the economy from substantive 
analysis of socioeconomic justice. In the familiar metaphor, legal economic analysis can 
and should reveal how to make the economic pie bigger without deciding how to divide 
the pie. Several flawed notions underlie the idea that law can analyze and increase 
economic gain free from contested judgments about who or what should gain. 
A. Essential Form versus Contingent Substance?  
 On the surface, the goal of maximizing seems open to including more of 
everything that some people value, including equality, or clean water, or a living wage, or 
international human rights, or safer workplaces, or nontoxic food. But because the binary 
frame defines economic gain apart from particular social values and contexts, the size of 
the economic “pie” (overall societal gain) appears to constitute a form devoid of 
contestable substance. That means when law aims to address a specific substantive 
problem, such as contaminated public water supplies or poverty level wages, that law 
presumptively serves to advance one partial interest or value rather than the goal of 
maximizing the whole. From that ground, any particular policies aimed at substantive 
qualities appear likely to divide rather than expand societal resources.  
 In short, the binary frame poses a leading question: should legal rules risk a 
smaller economic pie by distributing slices that are more equal, nontoxic or fair? Instead, 
we could logically frame legal economic analysis with a different foundational question: 
should legal rules risk a smaller pie overall by maximizing unequal, destructive, or unfair 
gains to some? That alternative framing highlights an alternative implicit presumption: 
                                                 
15 For a vision of the generative and creative functions of environmental law, see Jedediah Purdy, 
Understanding Environmental Law as Public Provision, blog post, Law and Political Economy Blog, Nov. 
29, 2017 (https://lpeblog.org/2017/11/29/understanding-environmental-law-as-public-provision). 
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that particular contested normative qualities are central to measuring the extent of 
economic gain.  
 The goal of efficiency or welfare maximizing essentially closes off analysis of 
contested substance by assuming economic gain takes shape as an impartial formal 
structure and process—a market order—that generally operates to expand societal 
resources without contested political and legal power. The maximizing ideal thereby 
renders suspect any legal support for restructuring the economy for a specific substantive 
goal other than more of what this unquestioned background process produces on its 
presumptively maximizing terms.  
 The binary frame, for example, initially appears open to the possibility that 
directing more resources toward environmental quality could increase socioeconomic gain 
overall. For example, if stricter pollution-control laws increase clean water by reducing 
petrochemical industry profits, those losses may be outweighed by gains in the fishing, 
farming, and tourism industries and by reduced illness among workers and their families. 
Nonetheless, that argument faces a high bar in a frame that assumes “maximum” 
economic gain generally need not depend on protecting clean water. Similarly, although 
the frame allows us to analyze specific failures in the maximizing order as grounds for 
legal re-ordering, that attempt at intervention will appear comparatively unreliable and 
debatable given the presumption that maximum productive gain is best generated without 
political direction.  
 Examined more closely, the founding premise of a maximizing order that stands 
apart from contested value masks a pervasive dependence on government protection. 
Law reforms mandating cleaner water are no more distributive—and no less productive—
than the specific property, tort, corporate, trade, constitutional and criminal laws and 
enforcement regimes that allow industries to profit by poisoning a region’s water system 
and shortening the lives of workers and community members.16  
B. Complete versus Partial?  
 The maximizing-dividing frame both mobilizes and evades an important precept 
drawn from legal realism and critical theories: the idea that normative ideals of justice—like 
equality, fairness or democracy—inevitably depend on partial, debatable interpretation, value, 
and perspective, not uncontestable deductive logic and objective fact. Against this recognition 
of law’s echoing epistemological and moral void, the idea of an impartial and comprehensive 
criterion for overall gain offers comforting assurance of clarity and consensus.17 In the 
                                                 
16 See Rena Steinzor, Why Not Jail? Industrial Catastrophes, Corporate Malfeasance, and Government 
Inaction (2014) (giving examples of how existing legal rules and institutions failed to deter or punish efforts 
to profit from reckless disregard for injury, death, and property destruction). 
17 See Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Nominalism, 60 Va. L. Rev. 451, 
482 (1974) (explaining the appeal of Richard Posner’s founding textbook).  
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framing binary, maximum gain—efficiency or welfare—by definition optimally accounts for 
and calibrates all perspectives and goals to produce as much as possible overall.18  
 Despite its grandiosity, this standard can seem to build on contemporary 
skepticism about grand claims to truth and justice. Similar to critical legal theory, for 
example, the maximizing criterion for evaluating law encourages us to recognize that 
differences in interest, perspective and power complicate seemingly neutral or noble legal 
principles like equality, fairness, or democracy. For example, if law is used to advance 
gender equity and economic justice by requiring employers to give workers protected 
leave time for parenting responsibilities, that policy might instead induce employers to 
hire fewer mothers or potential mothers, leaving women and struggling families worse off. 
Or perhaps this policy will hurt women co-workers who will be disproportionately 
expected to sacrifice their own time to pick up the extra work of absent parenting 
employees. Or perhaps legitimate gender neutrality is better measured by a non-
reproductive norm that does not assume women have parenting responsibilities.  
 The maximizing criterion appears to resolve the complexities and uncertainties of 
implementing social justice principles and policies, pushing analysis beyond good 
intentions and ideals. Like critical legal analysis or legal realism, the economic maximizing 
criteria highlights the limits of law, recognizing that private and informal power interacts 
with formal legal mandates and processes to produce a chain of consequences beyond the 
“law on the books.” For example, employers can have discretionary and discriminatory 
reactions to family leave mandates, so that these well-intentioned mandates make things 
worse. As critical theory cautions, those lacking the most power in a given system will be 
likely to be most at risk from systemic efforts to resist transformative change.  
  But unlike legal realism and critical analysis, the binary frame directs legal analysis 
to evade the vexing but engaging moral, political, and empirical questions of the public 
interest. Instead, it relieves responsibility for close analysis of the values and context of 
policies (like family leave requirements) by presenting a disengaged and simplistic 
formalism as the more reliable alternative to the imperfections of legal idealism.19 Much of 
the slippery ideological slope of the framing division rests on its assumption that overall 
societal gain is most reliably analyzed as a total quantity divorced from particular quality.  
C. Quantity versus Quality?  
 The separation of economic size from scrutiny of substance sets up a legal 
epistemology that makes analysis of particular moral and social qualities appear less 
                                                 
18 For a discussion and critique of the orthodox economic idea of the “market” as omniscient , see Philip 
Mirowski & Edward Nik-Khah, The Knowledge We Have Lost in Information: The History of Information 
in Modern Economics 7 (2017). 
19 See generally Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental Law and the Search for 
Objectivity (2010) (analyzing how economic cost-benefit analysis absolves legal decision makers of 
individual responsibility or commitment). 
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rational and legitimate than formal quantification.20 For example, legal economic scholars 
Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein defend quantified cost-benefit maximizing as the legal 
standard that should guide regulation.21 In response to criticisms of that method, they 
argue that regulators can and should include moral commitments to health, life and 
environment in this measurement of overall net benefit.22 To do so, they present 
individuals’ willingness to pay for those moral qualities in the existing market as the most 
reasonable legal proxy for the amount of those qualities that maximizes societal well-
being.23  
 Consider how this reasoning applies to residents of impoverished communities 
who seek to clean up local water sources poisoned from chemical industry pollution. 
Posner and Sunstein would direct regulators to evaluate whether those residents are 
willing and able to pay for remediating this harm with increased taxes or private 
donations—or if not, whether those residents can enlist wealthier or better organized 
allies to do so, or perhaps to at least fund and promote the costly quantitative empirical 
studies that will persuade regulators and judges of this willingness to pay. If those 
impoverished residents facing toxic water have not mobilized significant resources in 
support of cleaning up their water, 24 then (in this logic) regulators can comfortably and 
rationally assume that the residents are willing to bear any increased risks of cancer or 
falling home values as part of a tradeoff that maximizes the total public good from 
naturally scarce resources.  
 As this example shows, the problem with a quantitative approach to maximum 
societal well-being is not simply that some social values seem difficult to quantify, like the 
goals of preserving clean water, wilderness areas, or human lives, or the goal of cultivating 
trust in the political economic system. More fundamentally, the problem is that any claim 
to quantify a discrete and tangible gain to enlarge the societal “whole” necessarily rests on 
partial and contestable judgments of fact and value. Should a rural community’s lack of 
targeted charitable or electoral donations count as evidence that non-toxic water has less 
societal benefit than chemistry industry profits supported by well-funded industry 
lobbyists and lawyers? Or should that lack of individual investment in political support for 
non-toxic water count as evidence of societal loss due to that community’s unequal, 
distorted, or unfair political economic power? Perhaps families in polluted Louisiana 
bayous, for example, have already lost substantial home equity, health, jobs and other 
                                                 
20 See Mirowski & Nik-Khah, supra note 18, at 23-26 (tracing how orthodox microeconomic ideas of 
market rationality discredit and invert knowledge). 
21 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Commitments in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 103 Va. L. Rev. 1809, 
1821-24 (2017).  
22 Id. at 1811-14.  
23 Id. at 1839.  
24 See Arlie Hochschild, Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right (2016) 
(exploring numerous reasons why Louisiana residents aware of personal harm from industry environmental 
damage nonetheless fail to support stronger environmental regulations). 
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assets due to deteriorating environmental conditions, so that they have few resources to 
invest in protecting their values, while, in contrast, the polluting industries can devote 
their ample gains from that harm to lobby for further political and legal protection against 
environmental controls.  
 The crucial question is not merely how to count non-commodified “social” goals, 
but how we “count to one” on the legal economic scale, even for the most routinely 
quantified market commodities.25 What qualifies as the value that gets us from zero 
economic pie to any positive quantity of pie? Consider, for example, if private banks 
report an increase in net worth over the prior year. Does that gain count as more 
economic growth? Or does this quantity represent more asset bubbles ready to burst, 
more dubious accounting strategies, more monopolizing bank mergers, or more bank fees 
collected from falsified bank accounts or from fraudulent and discriminatory subprime 
loans? More fundamentally, is the current public and private structure of the banking 
industry a beneficial means of generating capital for real economic production, compared 
to other alternative systems?26 The regulatory process should explicitly engage and 
evaluate rather than assume and cover up these foundational questions about what 
qualitative standards best define and guide quantifiable gains.  
D. Private versus Public?  
 By detaching the size of the overall economic “pie” from particular substantive 
qualities, the foundational binary frame does the further ideological work of reducing 
public gain to private interests.27 On the surface, the maximizing-dividing frame offers an 
appealing alternative to the idea of public interest, which is inevitably contested and 
subject to imperfect politics and factual judgments. The maximizing criterion instead 
establishes the public welfare—maximum societal gain—as the seemingly more 
straightforward aggregation of private gain: a quantity of component parts that add up to 
a total sum conceptualized as a change in size without a change in kind or quality.   
 Defined as the total of individualized gain, the idea of a maximum overall gain—
or welfare—can appear to be a more practical, realistic and tangible guide to law than the 
public interest. At the individual level, we can reasonably imagine that private businesses 
and other economic agents often operate to maximize their private economic self-interest. 
From this ground, it can seem logical to further imagine an economic “whole” consisting 
                                                 
25 Tod Massa, On Counting to One, Random Data Blog, Aug. 13, 2015, 
(https://randomdatablog.com/2015/08/13/on-counting-to-one/) (discussed in Jeffrey Alan Johnson, How 
Data Does Political Things: The Process of Encoding and Decoding Data Are Never Neutral, LSE Impact 
Blog, Oct. 7, 2015 (http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2015/10/07/how-data-does-political-things)). 
26 Wallace C. Turbeville, A New Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Financial Regulation: Inefficiency 
of Capital Intermediation in a Deregulated System, 72 Md. L. Rev. 1173 (2013); Robert C. Hockett & Saule 
T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 1143 (2017).  
27 See Corey Robin, How Intellectuals Create the Public, The Chronicle Rev., Jan. 22, 2016 (explaining how 
legal scholar Cass Sunstein’s reduction of the public good to private preferences ends up destroying a 
meaningful public).  
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of multiple individual independent economic maximizers whose combined interactions 
maximize the size of the societal “pie.” In this view, any concerns of the public good left 
out of this aggregation can be addressed by separately tapping into this maximum pie to 
provide relief to those persons or values losing out in the process of private gain-seeking.  
 This bifurcation of public and private overlooks the more accurate economic 
understanding that collective institutions and ideologies ground any decentralized system 
of individualized private self-interest maximizing. Economic orthodoxy recognizes that a 
private “market” must be driven not only by atomized maximizers, but also by a public 
legal system. At a minimum, that system must define and secure property and contract 
rights, with political and legal institutions producing and regulating currency and credit; 
and civil and criminal justice systems capable of upholding and mediating those rights. 
But that orthodoxy generally neglects to consider how those basic legal rights and 
institutions raise fundamental and complex questions that have long generated conflict 
and social transformation.  
 In short, the framing concept of the larger whole as an “aggregation” of private 
components begs the fundamental question of the process of aggregating: the governing 
rules and institutions through which these private components are combined into an 
economic totality. Whether the particular gains of a given legal economic entity interacting 
with any other reflect a process of mutual self-interest maximizing or one-sided force, 
plunder, extortion, or fraud, is the omnipresent, inherently value-laden, question of law.28 
Regardless of elaborate mathematical or econometric models of the quantified aggregate 
whole, without judging the actual social and political quality of the process, we get no 
closer to rigorous or meaningful predictions or proof that any individualized gain will end 
up expanding or destroying societal “pie.”  
 Private market gains may appear to be a pragmatic starting point for determining 
maximum societal gain, at least in a market economic system that to some degree consists 
of competitive voluntary exchange. But even in established neoclassical theory, 
mainstream economics leaves plenty of room for doubt about whether private market 
maximizing normally or naturally operates as to maximize rather than minimize the 
economic whole, absent substantial, ongoing public oversight.  
 For example, Robert J. Shiller and George Akerlof (both winners of the Nobel 
Prize in Economics) develop established neoclassical economic theory to show that, 
without extensive public regulation for qualities of fairness, private markets are likely to 
induce private firms to “win” by concentrating on one-sided gains that in the aggregate 
reduce overall well-being.29 Fraudulent transactions exploiting the most vulnerable 
persons—what they term “phishing for phools”—constitute the “low hanging fruit” that 
                                                 
28 See Ugo Mattei & Laura Nader, Plunder: When the Rule of Law Is Illegal (2008) (showing how a 
technocratic vision of international financial regulation serves to rationalize violent and unequal extraction of 
resources). 
29 George A. Akerlof & Robert J. Shiller, Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and 
Deception (2016). 
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enable firms to maximize profits. As particularly “innovative,” aggressive, or 
unscrupulous firms pursue such irrational and unfair gains, these firms are likely to secure 
market (and political) power that they can use to increase others’ vulnerability and 
irrationality. That market power by the least scrupulous “winners” creates market 
pressures for other firms to follow suit, creating what legal economic scholars William 
Black and June Carbone describe as an increasingly criminogenic economic order where 
wrongdoing by powerful business organizations becomes normal and necessary.30 Shiller 
and Akerlof similarly describe how maximizing private gain without careful control for 
public-regarding values like equality and fairness leads to an economic “phishing 
equilibrium”31 that maximizes societal outcomes that are neither rational nor preferable 
from virtually any private person’s perspective.  
 As these analyses show, the political economic “whole” may be substantially less 
(or more than) than the sum of its private gain-seeking “parts.” Rather than imagining the 
public welfare as a bigger and better pie, a more plausible metaphor for determining 
overall economic well-being may be an ecosystem or organism where well-being does not 
correlate with growth in component parts. In that alternative model of the whole, the 
value of an increase in any quantifiable part of such a system (e.g., increased belly fat, air 
temperatures, or particular private firm’s profits) will likely be thoroughly dependent on 
how the other parts are distributed, supported and regulated.  
E. Precision versus Generality?  
 By constructing the maximum societal gain as an aggregate of atomized 
microeconomic pieces, the foundational binary elevates decontextualized, fragmented, 
and trivial evidence of gain over broader and deeper understandings of economic well-
being. For example, to include moral commitments in cost-benefit analysis of maximum 
societal gain, Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein advocate calculating private individuals’ 
willingness to pay for moral commitments to reducing harms like prison rape, climate 
change, or dolphin deaths from tuna fishing practices, measured (for example) by private 
donations to organizations protecting dolphins.32 Nonetheless, they exclude highly 
generalized moral values from this proposed calculation of optimal aggregate gain. Using 
the example of moral opposition to government regulation, they imagine that such general 
ideological preferences can be safely and soundly ignored by regulators because those 
preferences represent subjective ideals with trivial impact or could be evenly balanced by 
opposing views.33  
                                                 
30 William K. Black & June Carbone, Economic Ideology and the Rise of the Firm as a Criminal Enterprise, 
49 Akron L. Rev. 371, 375 (2015).  
31 Akerlof & Shiller, supra note 29, at 5-6. 
32 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 1813-17, 1827-30. 
33 Id. at 1835.  
McCluskey — Defining the Economic Pie 87 
 
 To the contrary, their example shows that, at this generalized ideological level, 
private power is most likely to have the most unequal and powerful influence on how 
regulators and other legal authorities evaluate competing economic, moral, and political 
positions. In recent decades in the U.S., wealthy business owners and allies have invested 
billions of dollars in creating a wide variety of institutions willing and able to pay 
politicians, lobbyists, media, scholars, judges, and regulators to help weaken government 
regulations protecting environmental and human health, fairness, and other social justice 
qualities.34 They have done so in part by funding, promoting, and litigating the idea that 
cost-benefit analysis deserves to be the measure of public well-being in federal regulation 
of industry.35  
 By excluding from the maximum “whole” the overarching question of the general 
moral qualities of the legal economic system, Posner and Sunstein implicitly affirm an 
ideology promoting unequal and unaccountable private gain regardless of resulting 
societal losses. Their regulatory standard denies that the well-being of workers, 
consumers, families, children, prisoners, elderly persons, and the environment can be 
independent criteria for overall societal well-being. By reducing these values to fungible 
consumer expenditures, their cost-benefit analysis does not meaningfully include these 
values but instead discounts them as expendable and abstract parts equivalent to market 
spending (on fossil fuel investments for example) likely to destroy those qualities of well-
being. 
 This superficial precision ironically closes off analysis and imagination of the 
possibilities for meaningfully enhancing societal well-being. By constructing the maximum 
political economic “pie” as a sum of discrete monetized pieces divorced from holistic 
value, the size of the pie necessarily becomes limited by the rule of existing market power. 
In this view, law cannot aim to directly alleviate or transform the harms that plausibly 
erode human and environmental well-being (like prison violence or environmental 
destruction), it can only improve how precisely it reflects and reinforces others’ 
willingness to tolerate or resist those harms under existing legal and political conditions.  
 Closer analysis shows that the goal of enlarging the political economic “whole” 
depends most fundamentally and clearly on the general qualities that Posner and 
Sunstein’s welfare maximizing standard dismisses. Indeed, these generalized qualities are 
likely to be among the most highly valued and most popular ideals. Consider, as examples, 
the general preference for a legal system not rigged to favor the wealthiest or the most 
                                                 
34 In 1999, a report calculated over a billion dollars in spending in the 1990s by the top twenty conservative 
think tanks in the U.S., and that this spending aimed to promote ideological opposition to industry 
regulation as one of its major goals. David Callahan, $1 Billion for Ideas: Conservative Think Tanks in the 
1990s, Center for Responsive Philanthropy 5-6, 15-16 (March 1999).  
35 John C. Coates IV, Cost Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 Yale 
L.J. 882, 885-86, 912-14 (2015) (describing efforts by business trade associations like the Chamber of 
Commerce to subject regulatory agencies to stringent cost-benefit standards).  
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immoral;36 or the value of health and environmental regulation that is governed more by 
independent science and broad public participation than by the public relations firms of 
the highest private bidders;37 or a preference for public policy focused on improving 
people’s economic options, rather than on codifying and solidifying existing constraints 
on those preferences;38 or a preference for a society that does not primarily reward and 
reinforce the value of maximizing short-term individualized self-interest in a ruthless 
societal competition to extract gain from increasingly devastated others.39  
III. Temporal Order: Maximizing Gain Before Justice 
A. First Maximizing, Then Redistributing?  
 The foundational frame further skews analysis by analyzing maximizing and 
dividing as a sequence of distinct functions. In the familiar law and economics story, 
making more pie logically comes first, so that an undefined “we” can then more easily 
move to the next step of slicing it differently to address concerns about quality and 
equality. The term “re-distribution,” commonly used to distinguish social justice goals 
from economic maximizing, explicitly inscribes this sequence. It positions some legal rules 
as the baseline impartial maximizing distribution, so that other legal rules identified with 
qualities like ethics, equality, or a healthy, stable environment stand apart as contested, 
subsequent re-distribution. That temporal storyline again obscures our vision of what 
qualities define the substance and process of economic winning. 
 Moreover, this standard law and economics framing sequence relies on a fuzzy 
and fictional idea of the second step of re-distribution. When law makes “more pie” we 
do not naturally get an economy full of self-interested pie-winners eager to stop winning 
and start sharing. Instead, those winners in the pie-maximizing game will plausibly prefer 
to use their gains to secure an even larger share of the future pie, without particular regard 
for the “losers.”40 That result is especially likely in a legal and economic order geared 
                                                 
36 See Tamar Frankel, Trust and Honesty: America’s Business Culture at a Crossroad (2008) (discussing 
trust in law and economics as a valuable public asset).  
37 Thomas O. McGarity & Wendy Wagner: Bending Science: How Special Interests Corrupt Public Health 
Research (2012); Rene Ebersole, Did Monsanto Ignore Evidence Linking its Weed Killer to Cancer, The 
Nation, Oct. 30, 2017, at 35, 38 (reporting the corporation’s efforts to influence research and regulators).  
38 See Martha T. McCluskey, Constitutional Economic Justice: Structural Power for “We the People,” 35 
Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 271 (2016) (developing a constitutional theory of economic freedom and well-being 
based on democratic collective power to reduce scarcity). 
39 See S.M. Amadae, Prisoners of Reason: Game Theory and Neoliberal Political Economy (2015) 
(explaining how neoliberal law and economic logic generates and rationalizes a system and subjectivity of 
pervasive predatory destruction).  
40 See Frank Pasquale, Capital’s Offense: Law’s Entrenchment of Inequality (reviewing Thomas Piketty, 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014)), b02, Oct. 1, 2014 (analyzing how capital concentration creates 
legal and political power to resist “redistribution”) (https://www.boundary2.org/2014/10/capitals-offense-
laws-entrenchment-of-inequality/). 
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toward legitimating and rewarding private pie-winning where there is minimal regard for 
public qualities like fairness, cooperation, and equality.41  
 Conventional law and economics often further allocates the two-step sequence of 
maximizing, then dividing, into different legal processes. As Cooter and Ulen explain in 
their textbook, after legal rules and regulations focus first and foremost on maximizing, 
questions of distribution can be addressed through a separate, subsequent process of 
government taxation and spending to avoid distorting law’s presumed baseline 
maximizing system.42  
 The political process governing taxing and spending, however, is not insulated 
from the power of self-interest maximizing winners, and indeed has become less so in 
part thanks to pie-winners willing to pay lavishly to change taxing and spending rules and 
ideologies to their advantage.43 In recent decades, these law reforms efforts have included 
loosening restrictions on political contributions and corruption; restricting Congressional 
deficit spending; changing constitutional law to limit federal spending powers, opposing 
tax increases on the wealthy by financing politicians, academics, media, academics and 
policy staff critical of “redistribution”; and reducing government resources for tax 
collection and enforcement.44 For example, organizations supported by the Koch family’s 
oil industry winnings recently announced plans to spend $400 million in the 2018 U.S. 
elections to promote political candidates favoring tax cuts for the wealthy and opposing 
government spending on Medicaid and other “redistributive” programs for the non-
wealthy.45  
 Similarly, the framing division’s fictional sequence obscures how winning self-
interest-maximizers will also be likely to invest in changing the private law rules that 
constitute the supposed baseline maximizing process. For example, organizations like the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American Legislative Exchange Council coordinate 
the biggest global economic “winners” to invest their resources in redistributing basic 
private market rights. This includes weakening collective bargaining rights; restricting state 
                                                 
41 See Adam Grant, More Evidence that Learning Economics Makes You Selfish, Evonomics, Feb. 3, 2016 
(http://evonomics.com/more-evidence-that-learning-economics-makes-you-selfish/) (summarizing how 
prevailing economic ideology affects behavior and values). 
42 Cooter & Ulen, supra note 2, at 106-08 (arguing that social justice goals like alleviating poverty should be 
achieved through progressive taxation and spending, not property rights).  
43 See Richard A. McAdams & Lee Anne Fennell, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics, 100 
Minn. L. Rev. 1051 (2016) (discussing political barriers to taxing and spending as a method for “redistribution”). 
44 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause after NFIB, 101 Geo. 
L. Rev. 861 (2013) (discussing the Court’s major new restriction on Congressional spending powers); 
ALEC’s 2016 Agenda Moving in the States: A Snapshot, PRWatch, 
(http://www.prwatch.org/news/2016/05/13099/alec%27s-2016-agenda-snapshot) (reporting on 
influential corporate-funded advocacy group’s push for a constitutional amendment requiring a balanced 
budget).  
45 Olivia Beavers, Koch Brothers to Spend $400 Million in the 2018 Elections, The Hill, June 25, 2017 
(http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/339399-koch-brothers-to-spend-400-million-on-
republican-candidates-in). 
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tort damages; insulating business executives from criminal responsibility for reckless death 
and injury; expanding intellectual property rights; changing antitrust law to increase 
industry concentration, reducing professional workers’ power to organize, and extending 
non-compete contracts penalizing low-wage workers from quitting bad jobs; promoting 
international trade laws that remove investors’ property rights from democratic sovereign 
control; or restricting consumers’ and workers’ access to public independent courts to 
enforce their property and contract rights.  
  The baseline legal economic “maximizing” order always defines and mobilizes a 
particular distribution of pie, with significant yet debatable effects on societal well-being. 
Sound legal analysis cannot coherently bracket the effects of that distribution by focusing 
first on a fixed fictional state of distributive neutrality.  
B. Upward Growth, Then Downward “Re-distribution”?  
 Indeed, the framing division does not ignore distributive concerns in defining 
baseline maximizing, but instead implies that inequality and injustice are the norm within 
the legal economic order—that is, both typical and typically beneficial. The second 
“dividing the pie” step presents equality and fairness as redistributive adjustments to 
accommodate those persons or values left out of a presumed preceding maximizing order. 
This implies that the step of “dividing the pie” involves moving resources downward 
from those who have more to those who have less, or from readily monetized values (like 
industry profit) to less marketable values like stability, safety, and integrity. As the Cooter 
and Ulen textbook explains, “Some people think that government should redistribute 
wealth from rich to poor for the sake of social justice, whereas other people think that 
government should avoid redistributing wealth, allowing individuals to receive all the 
rewards of their hard work, inventiveness, risk-taking, and astute choice of parents.”46  
 This ahistorical view of redistribution directs scrutiny and controversy toward 
policies promoting equality (or other social justice goals), while implicitly affirming 
policies promoting inequality as a presumptively objectively beneficial maximizing 
distribution. In this picture, resources normally and naturally flow upward toward the rich 
in the process of benefiting all. Inequality appears to be not only natural, but essential to 
the well-being of others, given the framing assumption of maximizing as a process of 
expanding overall “pie,” distinct from demands for particular slices. In that view, those at 
the top appear to deserve their gains from “hard work and inventiveness”47 regardless of 
losses to the rest or to fundamentals like integrity and planetary survival. 
 As the previous section of this essay explains, political processes aimed at 
adjusting legal rules to redistribute market gains are at least as likely to involve moving 
resources upward to existing private winners, reinforcing their success in disregarding the 
particular well-being of losing persons and values. Indeed, distrust of the politics and 
                                                 
46 Cooter & Ulen, supra note 2, at 106.  
47 Id. 
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“special interests” resulting from downward redistribution is a major theme of the 
conventional law and economics narrative, developed especially in public choice theory. 
Building on the maximizing-dividing frame, that orthodox view presents the political and 
legal process itself as a distorted market that operates to maximize private self-interest 
without the advantage of (assumed) market discipline from open competition and 
voluntary transactions. For example, the Liberty Encyclopedia of Law and Economics asserts 
that “redistribution” normally benefits the most politically organized interests at the 
expense of the most unorganized, rather than the poorest at the expense of the rich.48  
 That seemingly critical attention to economic power in law relies uncritically on 
imagining a baseline market insulated from access to coercive, contested law and politics. 
The problem that redistribution sparks powerful resistance shows that law reforms must 
strategically aim to restructure the conditions that generate existing unequal or destructive 
market power, rather than trying to supplement or redistribute that power after first 
maximizing it.  
 By stepping outside the ideological framing division between beneficial economic 
maximizing and suspect political dividing, we can turn analysis more honestly and 
rigorously to the central question of what rules should define the political economic game 
in the first place.49 In contrast to “distribution” or “re-distribution,” terms like “equality” 
or “fairness” can better direct scrutiny to the baseline rules for winning, opening up the 
possibilities for an economy that operates with less loss and scarcity.  
C. Accept Scarcity First, Then Mitigate Tragedy?  
 Confined by the framing division, law’s potential for overall good will be limited 
by a skewed diagnosis of economic problems. The frame’s sequential story implies 
socioeconomic justice problems arise either as side effects of the process of maximizing 
overall gain or as inevitable external constraints of natural scarcity limiting that maximum. 
To solve distributional problems, in this view, lawmakers must decide how much to 
correct or compensate those persons or interests losing out from this presumed benign 
initial process producing overall gain. The binary sequence therefore presents problems 
like poverty, inequality, corruption, financial market instability, or environmental 
destruction primarily as accidental or unfortunate tragedies, rather than injustices.  
 Though this sequential frame seems open to the possibility of subsequently 
mitigating these harms, it sets up the problem so that any such “redistributive” solution 
will reasonably require careful scrutiny and constraint. As second-order “redistribution,” 
any legal effort to correct or compensate particular harms will seem to move slices of the 
                                                 
48 Dwight R. Lee, Redistribution of Income, Concise Encyclopedia of Economics (Liberty Fund, Inc. 2007) 
(http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Redistribution.html). 
49 See Robert Reich, The Rigging of the American Market, Robert Reich blog post, Nov. 1, 2015 
(http://robertreich.org/post/132363519655) (explaining that debating downward government 
“redistribution” through taxing and spending detracts attention from the political movement for massive 
upward redistribution through legal rules). 
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economic pie from one interest to another, confronting us with tricky, controversial, and 
technical questions of tradeoffs between competing interests. And by starting with the 
assumption of a generally benign economic order, then any subsequent legal effort to 
deliberately single out some harms but not others for “redistribution” may seem more 
unjust than the original targeted loss. Further, this framing sequence suggests that 
particular losses are likely to be temporary blips or lags in the inexorable forward motion 
toward maximum total gain. From that view, the “losers” may seem better served by 
government action advancing and smoothing the pie-expanding progress rather than by 
redressing specific losses. 
 Finally, by framing the problems of socioeconomic quality and inequality as bad 
luck rather than bad law, or bad economics, the solutions appear largely beyond 
reasonable human legal economic knowledge and control.50 This prevailing frame 
encourages us to see the causes of “distributive” problems like global poverty, climate 
change, or financial crisis largely as the result of impartial aggregate maximizing under 
scarcity, or inevitable failures of human losers or regulators, rather than as the result of 
particular structures of legal and political power reflecting particular interests and 
ideologies.  
 By making scarcity the naturalized ground limiting subsequent solutions, demands 
for substantial “redistribution” to redress substantial or even catastrophic harms will 
appear to be naïve or risky social re-engineering. The smarter and more morally legitimate 
solutions, given this frame, must instead focus on limiting law’s redistributive 
compensation to narrowly tailored, meticulously calculated transfers to only the most 
deserving or demanding “losers.” That leaves those who remain unsatisfied or insecure to 
queue up for a piece of the presumably scarce but ever-expanding pie—or be locked up 
or otherwise punished and monitored for getting out of that line.  
D. First Making, Then Taking?  
1. Defining Productivity  
 By attributing economic losses to an initial process of beneficial maximizing under 
scarcity, the founding division further tilts the field so that law’s seemingly valid 
distributive function slides into fundamentally illegitimate “redistribution.” If we imagine 
that law first and foremost maximizes productive gain, then if law subsequently changes 
that existing resource distribution it will seem to force some to give up their legitimate 
rewards. That means redistribution can look like stealing from productive “makers” to 
reward unproductive “takers.”51  
                                                 
50 See Mirowski, supra note 18. 
51 See, e.g., Dominick T. Armentano, Redistribution Is Theft, Independent Institute, June 13, 2014 
(http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=4999). Donors to this think tank include Exxon 
Mobil, the David H. Koch Charitable Foundation, the John M. Olin Foundation, and the Cato Institute. See 
Desmog, The Independent Institute (TII) (https://www.desmogblog.com/independent-institute) 
(compiling tax records from 2001 to 2015).  
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 This slippery logic starts by imagining that legal analysis confronts the economy as 
an external sum of material resources that can either move forward toward maximum net 
gain or sideways in zero-sum transfers. According to this view, each legal move away 
from net gain is likely to take away from progress toward a bigger metaphorical pie, 
leaving us with tougher competition for scarce resources and more tragic losers. In his 
influential book, Efficiency versus Equity: The Big Tradeoff, Arthur Okun cautioned, “[W]e 
can’t have our cake of market efficiency and share it equally.”52 That paradigmatic tradeoff 
between a bigger and more equal pie represented a shift in prevailing theory away from 
the Keynesian macroeconomic theory that economic growth can be generated by 
egalitarian government social spending and industry regulation.  
 The scarce dessert metaphor stands more firmly against social justice in N. 
Gregory Mankiw’s leading introductory economics textbook, which asserts that “when 
the government tries to cut the economic pie into more equal slices, the pie gets 
smaller.”53 Mankiw’s narrative presents an initially optimal “economic pie,” abstracted 
from legal rights and macroeconomic institutions, that is then distorted by egalitarian 
policy. If government intervenes to require employers to pay a living wage, for example, 
Mankiw argues that workers will have less income because employers faced with increased 
labor costs will restore their original gains by reducing employment.54  
 Empirical data not only casts doubt on this prediction, but also shows that low 
wages can reduce employment and productivity by making work too costly. The 
contemporary low-waged United States economy stands out for the high portion of 
middle-aged workers who have dropped out of the labor market not to devote their 
energy to family, volunteering, education, or travel, but rather to cope with poverty, drug 
addiction, despair and depression.55 Countering Mankiw, economist Nancy Folbre 
analyzes how cognitive bias helps sustain the conventional economic assumption that the 
current system of highly unequal private market gains from work—such as skyrocketing 
executive compensation—reflect “just deserts” for superior productivity rather than 
unequal legal economic protections that often reward socioeconomic extraction rather than 
contribution.56  
 
                                                 
52 Arthur M. Okun, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff 2 (1975). 
53 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics 5 (2011). 
54 See N. Gregory Mankiw, The Cost of a Living Wage, Boston Globe, June 24, 2001 (arguing that 
government law can’t repeal the economic law of supply and demand that rewards productivity). 
55 See Council of Economic Advisors, Exec. Office of the President, The Long Term Decline in Prime-Age 
Male Labor Force Participation 5, June 22-26, 2016 (examining evidence of health and activities of male 
labor force dropouts); Alan B. Krueger, Where Have All the Workers Gone? An Inquiry into the Decline of 
the U.S. Labor Force Participation Rate, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Sept. 7, 2017 (analyzing 
high opioid prescription use and low well-being among prime age workers withdrawing from the labor force).  
56 See Nancy Folbre, Just Deserts? Earnings Inequality and Bargaining Power in the U.S., Center for 
Equitable Growth Working Paper (Oct. 2016) (responding to Mankiw’s defense of high earnings inequality). 
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2. Defining Waste  
  Framed against an initial presumed maximum pie, “redistributive” laws appear to 
threaten the pie not only by taking resources back from productive ends, but also by 
adding a costly separate process. Cooter and Ulen’s textbook invokes another scarce 
dessert story to illustrate what it presents as the inevitable “transaction costs” of the 
transfer. They imagine a law requiring one desert oasis to share its bowl of ice cream with 
a separate and distant oasis that lacks ice cream.57 The act of transferring resources from 
the original distribution to the second oasis means some resources are wasted: as 
someone runs with the bowl across the desert, some of the ice cream melts, leaving less 
for everyone to eat.58  
 This story implicitly distinguishes redistribution from normal legal rules protecting 
the first oasis’s presumed property right to the ice cream, so that any transfer depends on 
private bargaining. In theory, in a productive mutual maximizing exchange, the second 
oasis would have to curtail its demand for equal ice cream to account for the costs of any 
transfer. In contrast, with the hypothetical “redistributive” law, the second oasis relies on 
government enforcement without considering whether the sharing will result in a net loss 
overall.  
 But this story works by abstracting the two transfers from any context to assume a 
central distinction between productive exchange and wasteful redistribution. Any real 
context would raise the question of how to account for the indirect costs and government 
force involved in any seemingly productive exchange from the start. If the first oasis gets 
a property right to keep an unequal share of ice cream despite others’ competing 
demands, for example, will it be held to account for the full costs of the government 
policing and civil courts, environmental protection, and financial, social and political 
stability that enable it to enjoy its dessert despite hungry outsiders? Do the residents of 
the first oasis pay for government force used to secure jurisdiction over the productive 
land, or to secure the labor that tends the cows at low cost, or to enforce any patent on 
the ice cream making technology precluding the second oasis from making its own?  
  By framing social justice not as redistribution but instead as defining and 
organizing the basic terms of the productive process, we can more readily imagine how 
legal rules encouraging more equal sharing could lead to more resources by reducing what 
logically could be construed as wasteful “transaction costs.”59 Considering the ice cream 
story, perhaps egalitarian laws requiring sharing might lead the people from both oases to 
more cheaply access information, labor and manufacturing strategies that generate more 
productivity overall. Or perhaps by cooperating in a joint private enterprise or shared 
                                                 
57 Cooter & Ulen, supra note 2, at 105-06. 
58 Id.  
59 For a critique of the distinction between deadweight losses of “transaction costs” and “efficient 
transactions,” see Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation “Reform,” 
50 Rutgers L. Rev. 657, 736-742 (1998); Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
1661 (1989).  
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government they could better and more cheaply and sustainably secure the labor and 
supplies and financing that enables long term investments in better technologies and 
infrastructure for storage and transport.  
E. First Autonomy, Then Dependency?   
 By imagining social justice policies as transfers of scarce resources from 
productive winners to unfortunate losers, the binary frame constructs the beneficiaries of 
“distribution” as passive recipients who depend on government power to take away from 
autonomous others.60 Without questioning this sequence, even defenders of 
“redistribution” will end up treating that goal as a threat to individual freedom. For 
example, law scholar Daniel Markovits constructs “redistribution” as a tricky moral 
tradeoff between protecting economic “agents” and economic “patients.”61 He argues that 
economic winners do not necessarily deserve to keep their unequal gains because their 
success results from individual luck and subjective arbitrary tastes rather than hard work 
and inherent moral or economic superiority. Nonetheless, he assumes these winnings 
arise from an established first-order economic process of individualized choice largely free 
from questionable political and legal power. As a result, he advocates carefully limiting 
subsequent “redistributive” aid for hapless economic “patients” to minimize interfering 
with the choices of economic “agents” more fortunate in their talents and tastes.  
 Consider how this logic applies to those who have a talent with relatively modest 
value in the existing market—perhaps elementary school teachers, journalists, plumbers, 
police officers, or attorneys providing legal services for people in poverty. These 
“unlucky” individuals may deserve some redistribution to compensate for their less valued 
talents. But framed as redistribution, this compensation appears to require excluding any 
especially costly “tastes”62—like the ability to raise children, or access to life-saving cancer 
treatment, nontoxic air and water, higher education, or public judicial enforcement (rather 
than private arbitration) of individual contract and property rights. In this strained 
nonjudgmental moral balancing act, such expensive legal economic protections would 
likely interfere with the choices of others to use their more highly valued talents (perhaps 
as fast food industry executives, casino developers, or financial market speculators) to 
support their own expensive tastes in (for instance) fancy cars,63 or electoral campaigns, 
tax avoidance, mass incarceration, unrestricted carbon emissions, or access to exclusive 
                                                 
60 See Dominick T. Armentano, Redistribution is Theft, Independent Institute, June 13, 2014 
(http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=4999). Donors to this think tank include Exxon 
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61 Daniel Markovits, How Much Redistribution Should There Be?, 112 Yale L.J. 2291, 2299 (2003). 
62 Id. at 2318-19 (arguing that redistribution will be too costly if it supports expensive tastes). 
63 See Martha Fineman, Having a Child Is Nothing Like Deciding to Buy a Porsche, The Guardian, Dec. 1, 2013 
(responding to Mankiw’s arguments that health insurance companies should have a right to charge women more 
for covering the costs of childbirth, just like they charge drivers more to cover expensive car choices).  
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schools, housing, or citizenship insulated from less fortunate people (except as low-waged 
service workers).  
 To be fair, Markovits rejects what he calls the “somewhat hyperbolic” libertarian 
argument that redistributive taxation from rich to poor represents “enslaving the 
talented”: a property right in other (wealthier) persons.64 Instead, he proposes that law can 
sufficiently respect the freedom of those lucky to have higher-priced talents or lower-cost 
tastes by limiting redistribution to the amount of insurance against bad market luck 
rationally purchased by a hypothetical disembodied consumer before knowing the actual 
price of their talents and tastes in a not-yet-defined market. This formal model allows 
relatively constrained appropriation of winners’ property (taxes on wages, for instance) 
but protects against substantial interference with winners’ freedom to choose how they 
express their talents and tastes. In short, Markovits leaves open the accusation that 
redistribution is “theft” from wealthy owners, by instead proposing to limit redistribution 
to avoid “enslaving” them.  
 Markovits assumes the established political economic order substantially advances 
individual choice, even if it does not reflect individual merit. His analysis does not grapple 
with the problem that unequal market gains arise in the first place not just from variations 
in talent and taste but also (for example) from specific and changing bundles of property 
rights that operate with government force to restrict others’ choices.65 Stepping outside 
the frame that assumes an initial uncontroversial system of voluntary maximizing, we can 
instead scrutinize how law pervasively structures the choices offered by any real political 
economy.66 By leaving unquestioned those initial legal limits and privileges inherent in any 
particular “market” system, Markovits’s ungrounded reasoning can only provide a weak 
defense of changing that initial order to alleviate inequality. 
F. First Market Power, Then Powerless Democracy?  
 The concept of “redistribution” subtly diminishes our vision of equality and social 
justice by constructing those goals as compensation for failed market power, rather than as 
the affirmative power of democratic citizenship. For example, Markovits imagines a rational 
consumer purchasing inequality insurance from behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance about the 
market value of her tastes and talents.67 In his analysis, that model consumer would buy only 
minimum support to avoid paying high insurance costs likely to interfere with other future 
choices.68 His example erases consideration of that ideal rational actor’s power to define or 
                                                 
64 Markovits, supra note 61, at 2325.  
65 Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470 
(1923). 
66 See McCluskey, supra note 38, at 279-83, 286-91 (discussing, as examples, the dormant commerce clause 
and access to judicial enforcement of contract and property rights).  
67 See Markovits, supra note 61, at 2305-19, 2325-26 (developing an insurance model as the basis for 
appropriate levels of equality). 
68 See id. at 2318.  
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direct the market as a democratic citizen. That model consumer appears, for example, to have 
no power to decide how legal rules and institutions should organize the labor market that will 
price her individual talents, or how the legislative and regulatory systems should govern the 
insurance and health care markets, or what interests and ideals will structure the criminal 
justice system, monetary policy, the family, or other basic legal and political arrangements for 
providing security and productivity.69  
 Instead, imagine how a more truly free and powerful individual might confront the 
risk that the political economic order will make health care, retirement, clean water, and well-
educated children too costly for talented but modestly paid teachers, police officers, legal 
services attorneys, home health workers, small business owners, or plumbers, given the 
competing demands of individuals with extraordinary talents for rationalizing and gaining 
from privatized, volatile and fragmented health insurance, water utilities, retirement savings, 
and education systems. Or consider how that ideal free agent might respond to the risk that 
those “winners” will want to spend their gains to satisfy their tastes for designing these 
provisioning systems to extract high fees, high executive salaries and investor profits, or their 
taste for maximizing their freedom to exploit or cheat confused and vulnerable consumers 
struggling with limited options, or their taste for fostering a culture of distrust, despair, and 
political disillusionment to minimize resistance from the “losers” in these systems.  
 Faced with a consumer choice about whether to purchase limited, stigmatized, and 
costly relief for losing out in such a system, our ideally free individual might rationally reject 
that choice as fundamentally irrational, immoral, and coercive. Instead, a truly free and 
powerful agent might seek to organize an economy around different values and interests, 
rejecting the premise that the initial order must maximize gain unqualified by judgments of 
societal well-being, fairness and merit. By stepping outside the assumption of a market order 
normally and naturally established free of destructive or unjust power, we can have a more 
robust view of freedom modeled on a citizen who refuses to surrender to a system that offers 
them bad choices between saving money and saving their health, between saving jobs or 
saving the planet, between saving for their children’s education or for their retirement.70  
 As political theorist Corey Robin argues, the metaphor of distribution stands in the 
way of showing that egalitarian government protection against private economic power is 
fundamentally about enhancing liberty, not about trading freedom for security.71 Developing 
that view of freedom, an ideally rational agent might wisely and morally govern the economy 
with legal principles like democracy, equal protection, environmental stewardship, human 
                                                 
69 For a more robust vision of collective action as a source of personal freedom and power, see Martha A. 
Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 Yale J.L. & Feminism 1 
(2008). 
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rights, and due process. That ground allows us to celebrate, rather than agonize over,72 the 
fact that this system will constrain some people’s freedom to gain by undermining these 
values.  
IV. Reclaiming Legal Power to Define the Pie 
Legal economic analysis should not assume law’s role is first and foremost to act as an 
unseeing, unjudging, and passive facilitator of private self-defined gain. That view diminishes 
the power and value of law.  
 The maximizing-dividing framework subtly undermines traditional liberal political 
theory, which generally affirms some degree and form of public power as the ground of 
freedom and productivity. Liberalism (across both right and left leaning versions) assumes at 
least minimal public limits on private willingness to pay (restricting force or fraud, for 
example) and instead grounds political economy in some distinctly public qualities, such as 
due process, democratic legislation, principled adjudication in independent courts, or 
regulation subject to professional expertise and participatory public process.  
 In contrast, neoliberal theory draws on the maximizing-dividing frame to assert 
existing private gains as the ultimate measure of legitimate legal authority and economic 
prosperity, so that law should normally operate to maximize these gains. By assuming an 
economic optimum apart from public value, the binary frame positions democratic power to 
redirect or restrict that unqualified gain as a potential disruption and detriment to more 
legitimate and beneficial private authority, except as a limited supplement. In effect, the 
maximizing-dividing frame revives the infamous Lochner era theory that law should generally 
protect and enhance existing unequal market bargaining power as a fundamental right limiting 
democratic economic policy, with limited exceptions for those deemed incapable of market 
autonomy.73  
 To better advance social justice goals, law and economics must affirm the public 
democratic authority to define and control the quality and equality of economic power. 
Instead of asking whether to maximize or divide scarce resources, legal economics should 
focus on the possibilities for lifting the political and legal barriers that make human flourishing 
seem scarce and costly. Substantive social conditions like good jobs, healthy and stable 
environments, good education, safe housing, trustworthy businesses, and well-functioning 
democratic governments should be essential measures of overall socioeconomic well-being, 
not peripheral and secondary adjustments to an economic order presumed superior apart 
from those qualities.  
                                                 
72 See Markovits, supra note 61, at 2323 (focusing on the “dilemma” that redistribution will restrict some 
economic choices). 
73 See Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the 
Welfare State, 78 Ind. L.J. 783, 787-93 (2003) (explaining how neoliberal uses the problematic rhetorical 
distinction between redistribution and efficiency to revive Lochner’s naturalization of economic inequality); 
see also Nancy MacLean, Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for 
America (2017) (tracing how influential law and economics ideas have advanced political and legal efforts to 
undermine democracy).  
